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CONSUMER SALES FINANCING: PLACING THE
RISK FOR DEFECTIVE GOODS
The rising standard of living and extensive advertising of appliances
and other large consumer items creates a desire for goods beyond the
ability of many purchasers to pay cash. Dealers, unwilling to extend long-
term credit on personal security because of the uncertainties and delay of
repayment, have adopted the retained title instalment sale device in order
to turn over their stock. The instalment sale has become economically sig-
nificant during the last thirty years 1 and a rapid increase in the volume
of time sales, compared with personal loans and other types of credit, is
noticeable since the Second World War.2 Instalment selling in consumer
goods develops where there exists a demand for the goods and an ac-
ceptance in the law and the community of time purchasing. A particular
commodity will be the subject of instalment sales if there is either an
orderly second-hand market for the commodity or consumers able to make
a down payment sufficient to cover a large portion of the costs.3 Few
sellers are able to assume the burden of credit extension; the finance com-
pany and its counterpart, the consumer sales division of the bank, have
developed to supply this service. 4  The financing institution is now an in-
1. PLUMMER AND YOUNG, SALES FINANCE COMPANIES AND THEIR CREDIT
PRACTICES 73-6 (1940).
2. FED. RES. BULL. 186 (1954):
CONSUMER CREDIT
(Estimated amounts outstanding in





End of Year Paper Paper Loans
1939 1,497 1,620 1,008 2,719
1945 455 816 1,009 3,203
1950 6,342 4,337 2,805 6,323
1953 10,289 5,605 4,307 7,089
3. Isaacs, Instalment Selling: The Relation between Its Development in Modern
Business and the Law, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 141, 141-5 (1935).
4. CHAPMAN, COMMERCIAL BANKS AND CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT 21-6
(1940) ; Adelson, The Mechanics of the Instalment Credit Sale, 2 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 218, 218-9 (1935).
FED. RES. BULL. 186 (1954):
INSTALMENT CREDIT, BY HOLDER




End of Year Banks Companies Credit
1939 1,079 1,197 4,503
1941 1,726 1,797 6,085
1945 745 300 2,462
1949 4,439 2,950 11,516
1953 8,856 6,147 21,807
The term "financing institution" is used in this Note to refer to a bank or
finance company in the business of purchasing instalment contracts and promissory
notes from dealers.
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tegral part of the merchandising system,8 adding flexibility and increased
purchasing power to the economy.
The problem with which this Note is concerned is illustrated by the
following situation. Buyer agrees to an instalment purchase of an ul-
timately defective household appliance on the terms offered by Dealer.
As is routine in such sales, Dealer notifies Finance Company which, deter-
mining Buyer's credit standing to be satisfactory, agrees to finance the
impending sale. Buyer then signs a formal agreement which usually re-
tains title to the goods in Dealer, either a conditional sales contract, a
chattel mortgage or a bailment lease,6 collectively referred to in this Note
as instalment contracts. Concurrently, Buyer executes a promissory note
for the unpaid balance, insurance and a carrying charge. The contract and
note, both executed on forms supplied to Dealer by Finance Company,7
are negotiated to Finance Company which then appears to be a bona fide
purchaser for value of the contract and a holder in due course of the note 8
with a possible action for the purchase price free of Buyer's defenses.9
Dealer becomes insolvent and Buyer refuses to make payments on the
instalment contract because of the defects in the appliance. The subject
5. Note, 57 YALE L.J. 1414, 1416 (1948); Adelson, supra note 4, at 219.
6. A conditional sale contract is one in which the buyer takes immediate posses-
sion but title to the goods is reserved in the seller, usually until payment of part or
all of the purchase price. UNIFoRM CONDrriONAL SALEs Act § 1; National Cash
Register Co. v. Pfeifer, 149 Kan. 582, 88 P.2d 1032 (1939); see Universal Finance
Corp. v. Hamner, 61 S.D. 540, 544, 250 N.W. 33, 35 (1933); Russell v. Martin,
232 Mass. 379, 382, 122 N.E. 447, 448 (1919).
In a sale secured by a chattel mortgage, in a majority of states buyer takes
title but seller maintains a lien on the goods. See Thurston v. Buxton, 218 Ind.
585, 589, 34 N.E.2d 549, 550 (1941); Loudon v. Cooper, 3 Wash2d 229, 236, 100
P.2d 42, 45-6 (1940); Midland National Bank & Trust Co. v. Peterson, 229 Wis.
19, 20, 281 N.W. 683, 684 (1938). In a minority of states, the seller is said to re-
serve the legal title to the goods mortgaged and the buyer receives only the equitable
title. See Cambridge Production Credit Ass'n v. Patrick, 140 Ohio St. 521, 527,
45 N.E.2d 751, 754 (1942) ; Personal Finance Co. of Providence v. Henley-Kimball
Co., 61 R.I. 402, 410, 1 A.2d 121, 125 (1938). In either type of jurisdiction the
mortgagee has first a money claim and, on default, the right to satisfy the debt from
the goods mortgaged and a claim for a deficiency.
The, bailnent lease is seldom used for chattel sales, but proceeds on a theory
that the goods are delivered to the bailee (buyer) with an option to buy or have
rental payments applied to the purchase price. See Decker v. Williams, 130 Pa.
Super. 100, 104-5, 196 Atl. 910, 912 (1938); Donnelly v. Mitchell, 119 Iowa 432,
436, 93 N.W. 369, 371 (1903).
7. The bank or finance company supplies the instalment contract and promissory
note forms to the dealer as a matter of convenience and protection for itself. Were
the financing institution required to rely on forms drafted by each vendor, it would
be forced to have its counsel study each instrument, adding delay and expense to the
financing process.
Information regarding the operation of consumer credit institutions has been
gained through interviews with the officers and counsel of many of the banks and
finance companies in the Philadelphia area. For a comprehensive discussion of the
practical operations of consumer credit financing, see PLUMMER AND YOUNG, op. cit.
supra note 1; Cox, THE EcoNxomIcS OF INSTALMENT BUYING (1948); Adelson,
supra note 4.
8. Cotton v. John Deere Plow Co., 246 Ala. 36, 18 So.2d 727 (1944) ; B. A. C.
Corp. v. Cirucci, 131 N.J.L. 93, 35 A.2d 36 (Sup. Ct. 1944); United States v.
Novsam Realty Corp., 125 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1942).
9. See text infra at notes 24-9.
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of this Note, of importance to both Buyer and Finance Company, is whether
Buyer or Finance Company will bear the loss from the sale of the defective
goods.
Under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, a financing insti-
tution is usually deemed a holder in due course when it takes a negotiable
instrument in good faith and without notice of an infirmity in the instru-
ment or a defect in the title of the one negotiating it to him.10 As a holder
in due course, the financing institution holds the instrument free from any
defenses of breach of warranty and failure of consideration which may be
available to the maker against the dealer and "may enforce payment of
the instrument for the full amount thereof against all parties liable
thereon." 11 Ordinarily, therefore, a buyer of defective goods is liable to
the financing institution for the full contract price with only an action
against the dealer; such an action has little value if the dealer is insolvent.' 2
Under some recent statutes and decisions,13 however, the financing institu-
tion is made subject to the buyer's defenses and thus held responsible for
the quality of goods sold by denying to the financing institution the rights
of a holder in due course. Presumably, the basis for such a result is that
the necessitous borrower should be protected from bearing the burden of
the dealer's defaults when the financing institution is so close to the original
sale that it is, or should be, aware of defects in the goods sold'by the dealer.
Because of the split in opinion as to whether the financing institution,
regularly taking from dealers simultaneous indorsements of buyers' notes
and assignments of instalment contracts, is a holder in due course and
because courts frequently appear to neglect the practical implications of
such a decision, it is desirable to examine the problem and the doctrines
most widely used to meet it.14 In so doing, this Note will discuss the
applicable provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law, indicate the pos-
10. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 52: "A holder in due course is a holder
who has taken the instrument under the following conditions:
3. That he took it in good faith and for value;
4. That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity
in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it."
NEGOTIABIE INsTRUMENTs LAW § 56 provides:
"To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the
person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is negotiated must have had
actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that his
action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith."
11. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 57. The Negotiable Instruments Law is
cited hereafter in this Note as the NIL.
12. United States v. Novsam Realty Corp., 125 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1942);
Peoples Loan & Finance Co. v. Ledbetter, 69 Ga. App. 729, 26 S.E.2d 671 (2d
Div. 1943); White System of New Orleans v. Hall, 219 La. 440, 53 So.2d 227
(1951).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 615 G (Purdon Supp. 1953) ; Mutual Finance Co.
v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953) and cases cited infra note 28.
14. For similar problems arising in the fields of industrial, accounts receivable
and inventory financing, see SAULNIER AND JACOBY, FINANCING EQUIPMENT FOR
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE (1944); Koch, Economic Aspects of
Inventory and Receivables Financing, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 566 (1948);
SAULNIER AND JACOBY, ACCOUNTS REcEIvABLE FINANCING (1943).
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sible changes under the Uniform Commercial Code, and attempt to suggest
a practical solution acceptable to both the consumer and the financing insti-
tution.
RIGHTS OF THE FINANCING INSTITUTION ON DEFAULT
Although the financing institution's action on the promissory note of
a defaulting buyer is the primary concern of this Note, it is important,
for the sake of perspective, to examine briefly the alternative remedies
available to the financing institution. These consist, generally, of an action
to gain possession of the goods and an action for the sales price according
to the terms of the assigned contract.
Repossession of the Chattel
When a buyer defaults in his payments, he is sent a series of form
letters of increasing severity and, if payments are not forthcoming, he per-
sonally is contacted, usually by the financing institution's claim adjuster.
In practice, the financing institution ordinarily will respect a valid claim
that the goods are defective and will attempt to secure an adjustment be-
tween the buyer and dealer before taking any action against the buyer.'5
The continued prosperity of the financing institution depends upon the
dealer's remaining in business; excessive litigation injures both the good
will of the financing institution and the reputation of the seller. If the
buyer's dissatisfaction seems unwarranted, however, procedures to repos-
sess are instituted.
Most contracts used in instalment sales provide that upon default the
seller may take possession of the article sold without demand and without
legal process. The same result may be reached even in the absence of
such a repossession clause under the basic title retention clause.1' How-
ever, a repossession action is generally ineffective where the goods are
either unavailable, or of greatly diminished value, or where repossession
by legal action would subject the financing institution to personal defenses.
Recovery on the Contract
Since the rights of the assignee of an instalment contract are no greater
than those of his assignor, the right of the financing institution to recover
the sales price in an action on the contract, rather than on the negotiable
instrument, will be subject to the defenses of the buyer, although a few
cases holding that the note "imports negotiability" to the contract have
15. These conclusions are drawn from interviews with officers in the consumer
credit departments of leading banks and finance companies in the -Philadelphia
area. It is recognized that there are wide variances in these practices in the in-
stalment financing field.
16. Blackford v. Neaves, 23 Ariz. 501, 205 Pac. 587 (1922); Federal Sales
Co. of Philadelphia v. Kiefer, 273 Pa. 42, 116 Atl. 545 (1922).
"Repossession" is a term of art employed by the courts and in this Note to mean
gaining of possession, whether by the dealer or his assignee, of the chattel which
is the subject and security of the instalment sale.
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permitted replevin of the goods free of contract defenses.17 Conscious of
the availability of buyers' defenses, financing institutions seek to employ
devices which will bar the defenses. The principal device used for this
purpose is, of course, a negotiable instrument executed for the purchase
price (these notes are discussed below),18 but occasionally similar results
are obtained by including waiver clauses in the instalment contract itself.
Many courts have found no reason for denying parties the right to con-
tract away specific defenses which involve no moral turpitude or statutory
illegality. For instance, specific waivers of breach of warranty are usually
enforced.19 However, the majority of cases hold general waivers of de-
fenses invalid as attempts to settle the substantive rights of the parties
and oust the courts of their jurisdiction, contrary to public policy.20  Such
a rule is warranted by a recognition of the disparity of bargaining power
between buyer and dealer (most buyers have little choice but to accept a
contract drawn by the skilled attorneys of the financing institution) and an
awareness that denying the buyer a defense on the contract against the
assignee shifts the risk of loss to the one least able to afford it.
21
Recovery on the Negotiable Instrument
The financing institution resorts to its action on the promissory note
when it has no recourse against the dealer or when repossession or a suit
17. Commercial Credit Co. v. Seale, 30 Ala. App. 440, 8 So.2d 199 (1942);
Thal v. Credit Alliance Corp., 64 App. D.C. 328, 78 F.2d 212 (1935); Howard v.
Trusco Finance Co., 87 Ga. App. 509, 74 S.E.2d 379 (2d Div. 1953); Commercial
Credit Co. v. Summers, 154 Miss. 501, 122 So. 541 (1929).
18. See text following note 21 infra.
19. United States ex rel. and for benefit of Administrator of FHA v. Troy-
Parisian, Inc., 115 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1940) ; President and Directors of Manhattan
Co. v. Monogram Associates, Inc., 87 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Anglo-Cali-
fornia Trust Co. v. Hall, 61 Utah 223, 211 Pac. 991 (1922). See Beutel, Negotiability
by Contract, 28 ILL. L. REv. 205, 214-7 (1933) ; VoLD, SALEs 468-9 (1931) ; Gilmore
and Axelrod, Chattel Security: 1, 57 YALE L.J. 517, 544-6 (1948); Comment, 8
Wis. L. Ray. 272 (1933).
Section 71 of the Uniform Sales Act permits an express waiver of any implied
warranties of title or quality created under §§ 13-6. This policy is apparently fol-
lowed in § 2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
A waiver of failure of consideration has been held to be effective. Jones v.
Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 88 Ga. App. 24, 75 S.E.2d 822 (1st Div. 1953)
(waiver consistent with public policy allowed by statute). But the purchaser was
not bound by his waiver where a total failure of consideration was shown. American
National Bank of San Francisco v. A. G. Sommerville, Inc., 191 Cal. 364, 216 Pac.
376 (1923) (nondelivery and no estoppel in pais).
20. Equipment Acceptance Corp. v. Arwood Can Mfg. Co., 117 F.2d 442 (6th
Cir. 1941); Industrial Loan Co. of Cape Girardeau v. Grisham, 115 S.W.2d 214
(Mo. App. 1938); Progressive Finance and Realty Co. v. Stempel, 231 Mo. App.
721, 95 S.W.2d 834 (1936); Motor Contract Co. v. Van Der Volgen, 162 Wash.
449, 298 Pac. 705 (1931); Malas v. Lounsbury, 193 Wis. 531, 214 N.W. 332 (1927);
San Francisco Securities Corp. v. Phoenix Motor Co., 25 Ariz. 531, 220 Pac. 229
(1923) (interpreting state statute). Contra: Refrigeration Discount Corp. v.
Haskew, 194 Ark. 549, 108 S.W2d 908 (1937).
21. However, a clause commonly inserted in the instalment contract whereby
buyer acknowledges delivery and represents that he has no defense against the
dealer, has been held to estop the buyer from denying delivery where assignee had
no prior notice of nondelivery. Thorp Finance Corp. v. LeMire, 264 Wis. 220, 58
N.W.2d 641 (1953). Contra: American National Bank of San Francisco v. A. G.
Sommerville, Inc., 191 Cal. 364, 216 Pac. 376 (1923).
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on the contract would fail to satisfy the debt, as when the value of the
chattel is low or the buyer's defenses in a legal proceeding are effective.
When a dealer becomes insolvent its financing house can be left holding
contracts and notes with many years to run. Where its recourse against
the dealer is inadequate, the financing institution is forced, despite buyers'
complaints, to abandon its adjustment policy in favor of actions on the
notes. If these actions are successful, the remedies of the buyers against an
insolvent dealer on his personal contracts are of little value. Therefore,
the buyer with a good defense requires protection when the dealer becomes
insolvent or when a financing institution presses its claim without regard
to the equities of the buyer.2 The buyer may protect himself only by
asserting his defenses against the financing institution and these are not
available if the financing institution is a holder in due course.
The financing institution can be a holder in due course only of a nego-
tiable instrument. To be negotiable, the note must be in writing, must
contain an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain in money and must
be payable at a fixed or determinable future time.2 Generally, a note,
if otherwise negotiable, does not lose its negotiability because it was exe-
cuted concurrently with an instalment sale agreement 24 or because it evi-
dences its identification with the contract,25 since these facts do not render
unconditional the promise to pay. On occasion, the contract itself has
been drafted successfully as a negotiable instrument." In the usual case,
however, as a measure of protection to the buyer from the ultimate loss on
defective merchandise, most courts hold that an instalment contract is not
negotiable and cannot be made so merely by a specific stipulation. 27
Physical attachment of the note to an instalment sale contract with
intent that it be detached does not destroy negotiability,28 nor is detachment
22. For a description of improper practices of the predatory finance company
see PLUMER .M AND YOUNG, op. cit. supra note 1, at 231-43.
23. NIL § 1.
24. Each document is to be interpreted as a separate entity. Northwestern
Finance Co. v. Crouch, 258 Mich. 411, 242 N.W. 771 (1932); National Bond &
Investment Co. v. Lanners, 253 Ill. App. 262 (1928); cf. International Finance Co.
v. Magilansky, 105 Pa. Super. 309, 161 Atl. 613 (1932).
25. NIL § 3: "An unqualified order or promise to pay is unconditional .
though coupled with-
1. o
2. A statement of the transaction which gives rise to the instrument .
First & Lumbermen's National Bank of Chippewa Falls v. Buchholz, 220 Minn.
97, 18 N.W.2d 771 (1945); Shawano Finance Corp. v. Julius, 214 Wis. 637, 254
N.W. 355 (1934); National Bond & Investment Co. v. Lanners, 253 Ill. App. 262
(1928); Continental Guaranty Corp. v. Peoples Bus Line Inc., 31 Del. 595, 117
Atl. 275 (Super. Ct. 1922).
26. Abingdon Bank & Trust Co. v. Shipplett-Moloney Co., 316 Ill. App. 79,
43 N.E.2d 857 (1942); Commercial Credit Co. v. Seale, 30 Ala. App. 440, 8 So.2d
199 (1942); both cases holding that the contract is negotiable and giving judgment
for the financing institution as a holder in due course. Cf. Peoples Loan & Finance
Co. v. Ledbetter, 69 Ga. App. 729, 26 S.E.2d 671 (2d Div. 1943).
27. E.g., Carpenter v. Commercial Credit Co., 196 Ark. 475, 118 S.W.2d 581
(1938); Taylor v. Goodrich Tire & Rubber Co., 20 Tenn. App. 352, 98 S.W.2d
1094 (1935); American National Bank of San Francisco v. A. G. Sommerville,
Inc., 191 Cal. 364, 216 Pac. 376 (1923).
28. See text at note 23 and note 25 supra.
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of the note from the instalment contract a material alteration which would
discharge the buyer from liability.29 However, a few decisions conclude that
the note is nonnegotiable where an instalment contract is concurrently
assigned to the indorsee, on the theory that the promise to pay in the note
is conditioned on the payee's performance of his contractual duties.80 If it
is the conditional character of the contract which deprives the note of
negotiability, it seems that this theory should prevail even where the con-
tract was not assigned, but such is not the law.8 1
The financing institution as an indorsee of a negotiable note has
rights greater than those of the dealer-payee and is free of personal de-
fenses only if it is a holder in due course 32  To achieve this status, it must
take the negotiable instrument in good faith and without notice of an
infirmity in the instrument or a defect in the title of its indorser.n Knowl-
edge that the note was issued concurrently with an instalment contract
does not charge the financing institution with notice of infirmities, if none
appear on the face of the instrument,3 4 or of defenses of the maker, if it
had no actual knowledge of a breach in the contract at the time of indorse-
ment n even though the condition is known to be executory. 0 Thus a
29. Muskegon Citizens' Loan & Investment Co. v. Champayne, 257 Mich. 427,
241 N.W. 135 (1932) ; Crane v. Guaranty Finance Corp., 141 Miss. 692, 105 So. 485
(1925); Stevens v. Vermillion, 109 Kan. 504, 200 Pac. 277 (1921).
NIL § 124: "Where a negotiable instrument is materially altered without the
assent of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided, except as against a party who has
himself made, authorized or assented to the alteration .
30. Cooke v. Real Estate Trust Co., 180 Md. 133, 22 A.2d 554 (1941); Von
Nordheim v. Cornelius, 129 Neb. 719, 262 N.W. 832 (1935); cf. Federal Credit
Bureau, Inc. v. Zelkor Dining Car Corp., 238 App. Div. 379, 264 N.Y.S. 723 (1st
Dep't 1933), overruled on other grounds, Gellens v. 11 West 42d Street, Inc., 259
App. Div. 435, 19 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1st Dep't 1940) (rental agreement for a sign having
features of a conditional sales contract).
31. See text at note 23 and see note 25 supra.
32. Peoples Loan & Finance Co. v. Ledbetter, 69 Ga. App. 729, 26 S.E.2d 671
(2d Div. 1943); cf. United States v. Novsam Realty Corp., 125 F.2d 456 (2d Cir.
1942).
NIL § 58: "In the hands of any holder other than a holder in due course, a
negotiable instrument is subject to the same defenses as if it were nonnego-
tiable. .. ."
33. See note 10 supra.
34. United States v. Novsam Realty Corp., 125 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1942);
Robertson v. Northern Motor Securities Co., 105 Fla. 644, 142 So. 226 (1932);
cf. B. A. C. Corp. v. Cirucci, 131 N.J.L. 93, 35 A.2d 36 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (by terms
of contract, dealer gave no warranties, express or implied).
35. Cotton v. John Deere Plow Co., 246 Ala. 36, 18 So.2d 727 (1944); White
System of New Orleans, Inc. v. Hall, 219 La. 440, 53 So.2d 227 (1951) ; Standard
Acceptance Corp. v. Chapin, 277 Mass. 278, 178 N.E. 538 (1931); Baker State
Bank v. Grant, 54 Mont. 7, 166 Pac. 27 (1917); Eastern Acceptance Corp. v.
Kavlick, 10 N.J. Super. 253, 77 A.2d 49 (1950); International Finance Co. v.
Magilansky, 105 Pa. Super. 309, 161 Atl. 613 (1932).
36. Thal v. Credit Alliance Corp., 64 App. D.C. 328, 78 F.2d 212, cert. denied,
296 U.S. 598 (1935); Cotton v. John Deere Plow Co., 246 Ala 36, 18 So.2d 727
(1944) ; People's Bank v. Porter, 58 Cal. App. 41, 298 Pac. 200 (3d Dist. 1922);
Petroleum Acceptance Corp. v. Queen Anne Laundry Service, Inc., 265 App. Div.
692, 40 N.Y.S.2d 495 (2d Dep't 1943).
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financing institution which is a bona fide purchaser of an instalment con-
tract and a promissory note may be a holder in due course, and it is usually
so held.37
Notwithstanding this generally accepted interpretation of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, some cases in which personal defenses were raised
shift the loss to the financing institution. Some of these cases, while ac-
knowledging the negotiability of the note, hold that the financing insti-
tution is limited to the rights and obligations of its assignor and subject
to all defenses, on the theory that, since the contract and note were assigned
together, the financing institution takes the note with notice that payment
is subject to fulfillment of the contract conditions and therefore cannot be a
holder in due course.38 Some other recent cases deny the financing insti-
tution the rights of a holder in due course because of the closeness of its
relationship with the dealer.9 In Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin,40 a buyer
executed an instalment contract and a promissory note in favor of the
dealer for the purchase of a deep freezer. The paper was indorsed and
assigned immediately to the finance company which had investigated the
buyer's credit rating and had agreed to purchase the contract and note,
both of which were executed on its forms. In denying the status of holder
in due course to the finance company, the court held that the company
was so close to the sale that it could not claim to be an innocent purchaser
of the note without notice that the deep freezer was defective.
41
Ordinarily, the mere furnishing to the dealer of the sales forms is
not sufficient to impute knowledge of existing defenses to the financing
institution,42 but it is a factor which courts may utilize to find the neces-
sary close relationship.4 In Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin and similar
decisions, 44 the courts emphasized not only that the financing institution
37. Cases cited notes 34-6 supra.
38. First & Lumbermen's National Bank of Chippewa Falls v. Buchholz, 220
Minn. 97, 18 N.W.2d 771 (1945); State National Bank of El Paso v. Cantrell, 47
N.M. 389, 143 P2d 592 (1943); C. I. T. Corp. v. Joffe, 157 Misc. 225, 283 N.Y.S.
881 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1935), rev'd on other grounds, 162 Misc. 328, 293 N.Y.S. 659
(1st Dep't 1937); Heiman v. Murphy, 143 Misc. 81, 256 N.Y.S. 20 (N.Y. Munic.
Ct. 1932); Sloan Lumber Co. v. Ambrose, 26 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
39. Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953), 39 VA. L. REV.
830; Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal.2d 766,
214 P.2d 819 (1950), 25 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 107; Palmer v. Associates Discount
Corp., 124 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark.
1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940) ; Buffalo Industrial Bank v. De Marzio, 162 Misc. 742,
296 N.Y.S. 783 (Buffalo City Ct. 1937), rev'd by default, 6 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup.
Ct. 1937); Taylor v. Atlas Security Co., 213 Mo. App. 282, 249 S.W. 746 (1923).
But cf. Standard Motors Finance Co. v. Yellow Bayou Gin & Planting Co., 1 La.
App. 424 (1925); Mayer v. American Finance Corp., 172 Okla. 419, 45 P.2d 497
(1935); International Finance Co v. Magilansky, 105 Pa. Super. 309, 161 AtI. 613
(1932).
40. 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
41. See note 10 and text at note 11 supra.
42. International Finance Co. v. Magilansky, 105 Pa. Super. 309, 161 Atl. 613
(1932); Standard Motors Finance Co. v. Yellow Bayou Gin & Planting Co., 1 La.
App. 425 (1925) (by implication).
43. See note 39 supra.
44. Cases cited note 39 supra.
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supplied the forms, often being named in an assignment printed on them,
but also that it bought the paper from the dealer in the regular course of
its business, after first checking the buyer's credit and approving the sale,
took an indorsement of the note and a simultaneous assignment of the
sales agreement immediately after the sale, and collected the instalments
as they fell due. After examining the business relation between the dealer
and the financing institution, these cases conclude that the financing insti-
tution is not entitled to protection as a holder in due course either because
it was so close to the original sale that it could not be an innocent pur-
chaser of the note or because it is deemed a party to the sale. The tenor
of these decisions is that the financing institution should not be permitted
"to isolate itself behind the fictional fence of the law merchant" 4 and
thereby achieve an unfair advantage over the buyer."
The effect of decisions which deprive the indorsee of its status as a
holder in due course may be to force financing institutions to dissociate
from dealers to the extent that they will enter transactions only after the
sales are consummated. If this is the result, a buyer would lose what
benefit he now secures from supervision of the dealer by a financing insti-
tution and would still be unable to set up his defenses against the holder
of the note.47 It is possible, on the other hand, that the financing institu-
tion would abandon attempts to become a holder in due course and tighten
its control over the sales of the dealer to eliminate some causes of buyer
dissatisfaction; but this alternative is less likely. Bank officers point out
that all of the activities which courts have felt deprive a financing insti-
tution of its status as a holder in due course are commonly carried on by
the financing institution to facilitate sales and to permit the dealer to learn
in advance whether the instruments will be marketable if the sale is
effected. Financing organizations in fact learn little of the quality of
the goods or of the fairness of the price from these general business practices
upon which the courts base their decisions.8 But the courts in these cases
are warranted in their interpretation of the Negotiable Instruments Law
where the dealer is no more than an agent of the financing institution for
the loan of its funds.
While cases such as Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin do prevent injury
to an innocent buyer of defective merchandise, such decisions are not gen-
eral remedies since they leave unaltered the conditions and practices which
create the needifor adequate defenses. These will be corrected only by
45. Buffalo Industrial Bank v. De Marzio, 162 Misc. 742, 744, 296 N.Y.S. 783,
786 (Buffalo City Ct. 1937), rev'd by default, 6 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
46. See White System of New Orleans, Inc. v. Hall, 219 La. 440, 53 So.2d
227 (1951).
47. But one court has found that where the bank requires a certificate of satis-
factory completion signed by the buyer as a condition precedent to purchase of the
paper, the bank relies on more than the negotiability of the note, and has denied
it the rights of a holder in due course in such circumstances. Allied Building
Credits, Inc. v. Ellis, 258 S.W2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
48. Kripke, Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Speciality Under thw Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 59 YALE L.J. 1209, 1220-1 (1950).
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special legislation designed to regulate instalment sales. The current of
mutual interest between the dealer and the financing institution runs much
deeper than the cases disclose. The degree of control which the financing
institution exercises over the dealer's sales and the several devices it em-
ploys in order to protect itself from loss offer bases for a legislative deter-
mination of the amount of protection which should be afforded to the buyer
or the financing institution.
THE INTERRELATION OF DEALER AND FINANCING INSTITUTION
The dealer depends upon the financing institution to establish a financ-
ing charge which will permit a large volume of business at a competitive
price,49 and, in turn, the financing institution secures its profits from the
instalment sales the dealer is able to make. Recognizing that its business
is dependent on the financial standing and past experience of the dealer, a
financing institution will check the credit rating of a dealer with his sup-
pliers and banks and run spot checks at frequent intervals on his methods
of selling and quality of merchandise. 50 In addition to supervision of the
dealer, a financing institution employs several contractual devices in its
relationship with the dealer to protect itself from ultimate loss where
defective goods are sold.
Recourse Indorsements.-The contract and note forms which the
financing institution provides often have three or more bases of assign-
ment or indorsement printed on them.6 1 The dealer may adopt a ful
recourse indorsement by which he will be liable for the balance due if the
buyer defaults on any instalment. If the dealer wishes a measure of se-
curity for the possible conversion or destruction of the item sold he might
sign without recourse. " This relieves him of all liability except for the
statutory warranties made by a qualified indorsement5 3 or any warranties
49. Ecker, Commentary on "Usury in Instalment Sales," 2 LAw & CONTEMP.
PRoB. 173, 179-84 (1935).
50. PLUMMER AND YOUNG, op. cit. supra note 1, at 113-4.
51. See Palmer v. Associates Discount Corp., 124 F.2d 225, 227 (D.C. Cir.
1941); Schuck v. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 220 Ark. 56, 247 S.W.2d 1 (1952).
See generally Adelson, supra note 4, at 220-2; Cavers, The Cmnsumer's Stake in the
Finance Company Code Controversy, 2 LAw & CoNTzMP. PROB. 200, 202-10 (1935).
52. An indorsement without recourse is not restrictive under § 36 of the Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law but is a qualified indorsement under § 38, which does not
impair the negotiable character of the instrument. E.g., Eastern Acceptance Corp.
v. Kavlick, 10 N.J. Super. 253, 77 A.2d 49 (1950); Standard Acceptance Corp. v.,
Chapin, 277 Mass. 278, 178 N.E. 538 (1931). See note 53 infra.
53. NIL j 38: "A qualified indorsement . . . may be made by adding to the
indorser's signature the words 'without recourse,' or any words of similar import.
Such an indorsement does not impair the negotiable character of the instrument."
NIL § 65: "Every person negotiating an instrument by delivery or by a qualified
indorsement, warrants
1. That the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports tobe; 2. That he has a good title to it;
3. That all prior parties had capacity to contract;
4. That he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair the validity
of the instrument or render it valueless. . .. )'
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or guarantees he may give the financing institution by separate agreement.
Banks are circumspect in accepting paper on a nonrecourse basis and de-
mand that the purchaser be a good risk or that the dealer give other guar-
antees with the indorsement.
Repurchase Agreements.-It is common to accompany a nonrecourse
indorsement with a repurchase agreement which, if the repossessed chattel
is delivered by the financing institution to the dealer, may either bind him
to pay the entire unpaid balance on default or give him an option to
pay the unpaid balance or a stated amount. In either case, the dealer
is released from liability and has possession of the chattel. In such repur-
chase plans, the financing institution ordinarily is obliged to repossess within
a given period after default, thus giving the dealer some protection against
losses on a stolen or destroyed article.54  In other types of agreements,
the dealer may consent to partial liability, such as a guarantee of a certain
number of payments or of an amount equal to the deficiency between the
buyer's down payment and the down payment requested by the financing
institution.
Warranties.-In addition, a dealer customarily signs a standard con-
tract with the financing institution by which he unconditionally warrants
and guarantees his title to the merchandise he sells, the validity of the
paper he indorses to the financing institution, delivery of the goods and
the absence of any claims or set-offs against the contracts. The dealer
may also agree to file or record the instruments. Such warranties offer
the financing institution protection against loss resulting from these defects
and are valuable where no other recourse is available.
Reserve Plans.-The nonrecourse indorsement and repurchase plan
is often accompanied by a reserve arrangement under which the financing
institution credits to the dealer's account a fixed percentage (commonly
one-third) of the financing charge, i.e., the difference between the instal-
ment contract price and the cash sale price. Against this reserve the
financing institution will charge any losses suffered by it on delinquent
payments, added collection expenses and any other liabilities incurred in
handling the dealer's paper. When the reserve exceeds a certain fixed
percentage of the total payments receivable on that dealer's sales or when
the financing institution has little paper of that dealer outstanding and the
dealer-financing organization arrangement is terminated, the excess or total
amount is paid to the dealer.55 For the efficient dealer whose customers
seldom default, this reserve bonus arrangement offers a real source of
income in addition to the ordinary profit on his sales and is exploited as a
competitive device by financing institutions in bidding for the accounts of
automobile and large appliance dealers.
54. Pacific Finance Corp. of California v. Burkhart, 56 Ariz. 383, 108 P.2d
380 (1940).
55. See Schuck v. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 220 Ark. 56, 60, 247 S.W.2d 1,
3-4 (1952).
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The financing institution holds a dominant position in three-party in-
stalment sales and is better equipped than the average buyer to check on
the over-all operations and continuing solvency of its dealers. The usual
control which a financing institution enjoys over a dealer demonstrates the
logic of those decisions which permit personal defenses against the financing
institution. It is important to the financing institution to have the rights
of a holder in due course of a note given with an instalment contract when
its recourse against the dealer is inadequate or when the dealer is insolvent.
Yet granting these rights to the financing institution when the dealer is
insolvent places the ultimate loss for defective goods on the buyer, for his
remedy against the dealer is worthless. The buyer pays a premium for
the privilege of buying on time; his instalments include a charge for in-
surance, a profit for the financing institution and often a bonus for the
'dealer. These payments should also entitle the buyer to protection against
defective goods, but few courts have interpreted the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law to afford this protection to the buyer.
THE SOLUTION OFFERED BY THE CODE
The Uniform Commercial Code, by offering limited but definite rights
to the buyer, represents an advance over the Negotiable Instruments Law,
but the advance is a compromise and far from satisfactory. Under the
Code, the instalment buyer of any goods not to be used for personal, house-
hold or family purposes 56 may effectively waive all claims and defenses
against the financing institution which takes for value, in good faith and
without notice of a claim or defense.57 The waiver may be made explicitly
in the contract or by executing a note with the instalment contract. This
56. The author of a recent article points out what he considers to be two serious
technical defects in the handling of this problem by the Code. Kripke, supra note
48, at 1217. The Code does not disclose how an indorsee is to discover, first, that
the note arose in a secured transaction and, second, that the article purchased was
a consumer good, both of which facts affect his rights as a holder of the paper
under § 9-206. Kripke points out, supra note 48, at 1217 n.21, that:
"'Consumer goods' are defined in § 9-109 (1) to mean goods used for the
debtor's personal, family or household purposes. Thus a passenger automobile
is or is not a consumer good depending on whether it is used for family or for
business purposes."
All references to the Uniform Commercial Code (cited throughout this Note
as UCC) are to the Official Draft of the Uniform Commercial Code as proposed
by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform Laws, Text and Comments Edition (1952). The only state to adopt the
Code to date is Pennsylvania where it will take effect on July 1, 1954. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12A (Purdon Supp. 1953).
57. But a waiver of those defenses which may be asserted against a holder in
due course is ineffective. UCC § 9-206 (2) provides:
"In all other cases an agreement by a buyer that he will not assert against an
assignee any claim or defense arising out of the sale is enforceable by an assignee
who takes his assignment for value, in good faith and without notice of claim or de-
fense, except as to defenses of a type which may be asserted against a holder in due
course of a negotiable instrument under the Article on Commercial Paper (Article
3). A buyer who as part of one transaction signs both a negotiable instrument and
a security agreement makes such an agreement."
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codifies the view that the purchaser of goods for industrial or business
purposes is not in so weak a bargaining position as to deserve special
protection.
However, a contractual waiver of defenses against the assignee of the
instalment contract is not effective if it is made by a purchaser of consumer
goods. Similarly, a holder in due course of a note executed concurrently
with the instalment sale of consumer goods is subject to defenses only if
he seeks either to enforce the contract or to levy on the goods themselves
after getting a judgment on the note.58 These are apparently the only pro-
tections gained by the purchaser of consumer goods under an instalment
sale agreement governed by the Code. With regard to whether the financ-
ing institution is subject to the defenses of the buyer in a suit on the note,
a comment to the relevant section states that:
".. . there are indications in the case law that courts are beginning
to question the holder-in-due-course status of finance companies or
banks regularly discounting a dealer's consumer chattel paper. This
Article takes no position on whether such a bank or finance company
is or is not a holder in due course; that question remains to be deter-
mined under . . . [the Article on negotiable instruments]." 59
The determination of this question appears to be no clearer under the Code
than it is under the NIL.
The Code adds as a qualification to the usual requirements of the
NIL,60 that:
"A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) . . .
(b) in good faith including observance of the reasonable com-
mercial standards of any business in which the holder mtay be en-
gaged. .. ,,.
This added clause may offer a peg on which courts might hang a denial
to financing institutions of holder in due course status in instalment sales
and thus make effective the buyer's defenses in those cases not specifically
covered by the Code; at least it would make such a decision easier to sup-
port. Yet it does not appear that the new language imposes upon the bank
58. UCC § 9-206 (1) provides:
"An agreement by a buyer of consumer goods as part of the contract for sale
that he will not assert against an assignee any claim or defense arising out of the
sale is not enforceable by any person. If such a buyer as part of one transaction
signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement even a holder in due
course of the negotiable instrument is subject to such claims or defenses if he seeks
to enforce the security interest either by proceeding under the security agreement
or by attaching or levying upon the goods in an action upon the instrument."
59. UCC § 9-206, comment 2.
60. See note 10 supra.
61. UCC § 3-302 (italics added).
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or finance company a higher duty of investigation and supervision of the
dealer's transactions than does the present case law of each state under
the NIL. A comment to this section states that:
"The 'reasonable commercial standards' language added here . . .
merely makes explicit what has long been implicit in case law handling
of the 'good faith' concept." 62
Since there are few cases in which the "good faith" of the financing insti-
tution is successfully challenged,6 this section is not likely to alter current
business practices in any way favorable to the consumer. A more adequate
and predictable solution demands that the problem be dealt with by specific
legislative action.
LEGISLATIvE RE EDDIES
As part of a comprehensive scheme to regulate the entire instalment
sales transaction, some states solve the problem of when the financing insti-
tution should be a holder in due course by allowing the buyer who executes
a negotiable instrument in addition to the contract to assert against sub-
sequent holders all defenses he may have against the dealer.M Such legis-
lation might, like the Maryland Retail Instalment Sales Act,"s encompass
all retail instalment sales, or, like the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Sales
Financing Act,8 6 it might apply only to the sales of a specific class of
merchandise. This type of legislation offers needed protection to the
buyer and eliminates uncertainties in the position of the financing insti-
tution, forcing it to arrange for adequate recourse against its dealers and
to adjust the financing charge to meet the risks involved.
CONCLUSION
Those cases which permit a financing institution to exercise the rights
of a holder in due course against an instalment buyer when the dealer is
insolvent place the loss for defective merchandise squarely on the buyer,
for his remedy against the dealer is worthless. A similar burden rests
62. UCC § 3-302, comment 1.
63. See cases cited note 39 supra.
64. MD. ANN. CoDs GEN. LAWS art. 83, § 134 (Flack 1951):
"If, as part of an instalment transaction, a note is taken by the seller or finance
company, such note shall refer to the instalment agreement out of which it arises
and, in the hands of any subsequent holder, such note shall be subject to all defenses
which the buyer might have asserted against the seller or . . . [finance] com-
pany. ...
PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 69, § 615 G (Purdon Supp. 1953):
"No installment sale contract shall require or entail the execution of any note
or series of notes by the buyer, which when separately negotiated, will cut off as to
third parties any right of action or defense which the buyer may have against the
original seller."
65. MD. ANN. CoDE Gas. LAws art. 83, §§ 116-40 (Flack 1951).
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 601-37 (Purdon Supp. 1953).
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on the buyer even if the dealer is solvent, because few buyers are able
to afford the cost of legal action to recover their loss on the sale. The
best solution lies in special legislation providing for regulation of the
entire instalment sales system and permitting a buyer to assert such de-
fenses against the financing institution as he may have against the dealer.
It may be contended that denying holder in due course status on
instalment bank notes to banks and financing companies will force them to
resort to personal loans or to deal only with financially sound houses,
driving the small firm out of business. Even if the small dealer who is
a sound moral risk is not able to find a market for his paper, there is no
reason consciously to protect the economically weak dealer to the detriment
of a large class of instalment buyers. Under such instalment sales legisla-
tion, the financing institution, unless it wishes to be a self-insurer, will
deal with reputable dealers on a full recourse and repurchase basis, which
should not cause a decrease in the volume of consumer sales. The financing
institution would discount instalment contracts and notes where the charge
is commensurate with the risk and, if a default occurs and a contract de-
fense is asserted, require that the dealer repurchase the paper and adjust
for himself the dissatisfaction of the consumer. This would shift from the
buyer to the financing institution the risk of dealer insolvency, placing the
risk on one better able to anticipate it and to bear any resulting losses.
